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LAWYERS AS DIRECTORS
OF CLIENT CORPORATIONS
By M. Thomas Arnold
The lawyer as director of a client corporation is
a multifaceted topic. While not exhaustive of all
issues pertaining to outside counsel serving as
director, my remarks-some of which may be
more relevant in the public corporation con-
text-will focus on two questions. First, what are
the legal implications of board membership for a
lawyer? Second, should lawyers serve on the
boards of client corporations? With respect to the
second question, I will attempt to avoid being
overly dogmatic, hoping instead to impart some
of the flavor of the controversy.
I. A LAWYER AS A DIRECTOR
IS A DIRECTOR
While a logician might tell you that the above
statement is tautological, there is, perhaps, a
moral. A directorship cannot be treated as a
purely honorary position., The lawyer-director is
subject to all the duties and obligations placed
upon directors by state and federal law.
A. OBLIGATIONS OF A DIRECTOR
UNDER STATE LAW
The import of director status under state law in-
cludes the imposition of fiduciary status. The
Oklahoma Business Corporation Act expressly
states that directors "stand in a fiduciary relation
to the corporation." 2 The fiduciary duties of a
lawyer-director would prohibit, among other
things, the seizing of corporate opportunities,
competing unfairly with the corporation, dealing
with the corporation on unfair terms and accept-
ing bribes for acting adversely to the corporation's
interests. 3 "[Nione of these prohibited activities
should trouble any honest director, whether he is
a lawyer or non-lawyer. " 4
In addidion, the Oklahoma Business Corpora-
tion Act provides that the affairs of the corpora-
tion "shall be managed and conducted by a board
of directors." Thus, the director of a corporation
is charged with the duty of managing the corpora-
tion, and he or she must do so with "that
diligence, care, and skill which ordinarily prudent
men would exercise under similar circumstances in
like position." 6 This would presumably place an
obligation on the director to keep informed as to
corporate affairs, to attend board and committee
meetings regularly, and to exercise reasonable
business judgment.
The lawyer-director may be held, in some cases,
to a higher standard of care than a layperson. The
Oklahoma Business Corporation Act uses the
phrase "under similar circumstances" in describing
the director's duty of care,7 as does the Model
Business Corporation Act.8 The drafter's com-
ments to the Model Business Corporation Act
state that this phrase "gives recognition to the fact
that the special qualifications a particular director
may possess . . .. may place a measure of respon-
sibility upon such director which may differ from
that placed upon another director.""
The lawyer-director should bear in mind,
however, that "[iut is well settled that directors do
not serve as-insurers; they do not guarantee the
company's success." 0 If the rule were otherwise,
capable individuals would be extremely reluctant
to accept directorships. The director is given a
great measure of protection by the business judg-
ment rule" and by the requirement that, to be ac-
tionable, failure to exercise appropriate diligence
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and skill in the management of a corporation must
cause injury to the corporation.12
On the other hand, a lawyer-director would be
remiss if overly complacent regarding his or her
duty to exercise care in the management of the af-
fairs of the client corporation. Despite the limited
number of directors held liable in this context,13
one would not wish to be graced with the dubious
distinction of being one of the few.
B. OBLIGATIONS OF A DIRECTOR UNDER
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Very briefly, the lawyer as a director is subject
to all the duties and liabilities imposed on direc-
tors by the Securities Act of 1933"4 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15 These would in-
clude, for example, the prohibition against trading
on inside information, 16 the obligation to give up
"profits" made on short-swing transactions in
equity securities registered under the 1934 Act,17
the prohibition against short sales of equity
securities registered under the 1934 Act,18 and the
liability for errors in registration statements utiliz-
ed in public offerings under the 1933 Act."
C. THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE
The lawyer considering accepting a directorship
should explore the matters of indemnification and
directors and officers' (D & 0) insurance. Since
the lawyer as a director would be functioning in a
business-as opposed to a professional or
legal-capacity, it is doubtful that his or her pro-
fessional liability coverage would extend to claims
made against him or her qua director.
Oklahoma-and a number of other states-has
a non-exclusive provision in its Business Corpora-
tion Act empowering corporations, subject to cer-
tain restrictions, to indemnify corporate directors
for liabilities arising out of their service as direc-
tors and authorizing the purchase and
maintenance by corporations of insurance cover-
ing claims against directors.20 A lawyer joining the
board of a corporation should inspect the ap-
plicable indemnification statute. In addition,
"[wlithout regard to whether the statute is ex-
clusive, [he or she] should determine whether [the]
corporation has a charter or bylaw provision deal-
ing with indemnity. It could be more restrictive
than the statute." 2 ' Finally, one commentator has
suggested that "[a] lawyer going on a Board of
Directors should inquire as to whether the cor-
poration has D & 0 insurance and, if not, he
should ask the board to obtain a quotation and
consider such a purchase.""
II. SHOULD LAWYERS BE PROHIBITED
FROM SERVING ON THE BOARDS
OF CLIENT CORPORATIONS?
Some law firms do prohibit lawyers affiliated
with the firm from serving on the boards of client
corporations." In a Salt Lake City survey, sixteen
percent of the lawyers who responded were with
firms that had adopted such an approach.24 One
problem with a law firm policy prohibiting the ac-
ceptance of directorships with client corporations
is that the unilateral adoption of standards of
ethical behavior may have costs if others do not
follow suit. One lawyer relates:
We have a strong policy in our firm ....
against serving as a director where we repre-
sent the company more or less generally. And
our experience in one or two instances has
been that the company wanted somebody
from the firm to serve as a director . . . . A
prominent lawyer from another law firm was
contacted who said, Yes, he would serve as a
director, but only in the event the company
shifted its business to his law firm. 2 5
Some lawyers purport to deplore the practice of
accepting directorships with client corporations
while continuing to do so.' 6 One commentator,
adopting a more cynical approach than my own,
states:
When the company's chief executive . ...
asks [counsel] to go on the board, it is more
than an invitation; it is a summons into the in-
ner sanctum of management that from
counsel's point of view cements the relation-
ship of his firm to the client, or more pre-
cisely, of the firm to management. The invita-
tion could be refused but there is concern not
to affront the valued client, whose understan-
ding of the ethical implications will
presumably be less than his lawyer's . . ..
Candor, then, requires the conclusion that the
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bar's occasional sensitivity to the issues of
professionalism inherent in the subject has
been dulled by the dollars involved. 27
The Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers as it is now constituted does not prohibit
a lawyer from serving as a director of a client cor-
poration. It has been suggested that the Code be
amended to include just such a prohibition.28
Comparisons have been made between the at-
torney and the accountant who is proscribed by
the code of ethics of his or her profession from
serving on the board of a client corporation. 29
It has been proffered that "[tihe lawyer is in no
less need of complete independence in the expres-
sion of his legal opinion regarding his clients' pro-
grams and actions" than is the accountant.3 0 One
question here is whether the lawyer-director is
able to "resist fully the temptation in close cases to
trim his legal opinion to match his affirmative
vote for management proposals."3 1
In addition to concern about the need for in-
dependence on the part of outside corporate
counsel, questions have been raised regarding the
effect of board membership on the lawyer's ability
to be taken seriously in his role of counsellor. Pro-
fessor Mundheim has asked:
If I am prepared to support a course of ac-
tion as a director, how will that affect my
lawyer's role in . . . . having the other
members of the board take my descriptions of
the [legal] risks seriously and weigh them in-
dependently when they know how I am going
to vote as a director.3 2
Even if the other members of the board are able
to take the lawyer-director seriously in both
capacities, it is not clear that these dual roles are
separable in the context of a board or committee
meeting. One potential ramification of this is loss
of the attorney-client privilege. For a communica-
tion at a board meeting to be privileged in
Oklahoma courts, for example, it must be made
for the "purpose of facilitating the rendition of
legal services."3 3 Thus, it seems the advice must be
solicited from the lawyer-director in his or her
capacity as a lawyer and not as a director.3 4
Finally, it has been argued that the lawyer who
serves as a director of a client corporation is in an
inherent conflict of interest situation with regard
to the selection, retention, and payment of his or
her firm as outside counsel.3s
The question of whether the Code should pro-
hibit lawyers from serving as a director of a client
corporation is not, however, one-sided. Many feel
that it would be unwise to amend the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility to include such a proscrip-
tion.
One argument advanced in favor of this posi-
tion is simply that lawyers, by virtue of their
training and experience, make good directors.36
Apart from the merits of whether this is true, it is
likely that a client corporation perceives this to be
true. One lawyer has recounted that:
a client recently used the following
argument to urge me to join a board. He said:
'I would like you on the board because I know
if you are on the board you are going to worry
.... I know you will try to do the right
thing. So I want you there, worrying.'3 7
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In addition, it is argued that placing corporate
counsel on the board gives him or her an oppor-
tunity to practice preventive law.3 8 Many believe,
as I do, that the lawyer is most successful when he
or she prevents his or her client from getting en-
tangled in the first place.
One lawyer, speaking in favor of counsel serv-
ing as director, has stated: "2,000 corporations,
2,000 lawyers and 2,000 law firms can't be
wrong." 3 9 My mother used to respond to my use
of similar logic by asking whether I would put
beans in my ears if everyone else did."o However,
again, there may be a moral. Before the Code of
Professional Responsibility is amended to prohibit
an attorney from accepting a directorship of a
client corporation perhaps we should attempt to
answer two questions. First, what, if anything,
does the corporate management expect to gain
from having counsel as a director? Second, assum-
ing we can ascertain the contemplated benefit,
could it be obtained in a practical sense if outside
counsel were prohibited from joining the board?"4
CONCLUSION
The debate over whether the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility for Lawyers should prohibit
board membership by outside counsel has gone on
for a number of years and can be expected to con-
tinue. 4 2 There are certainly compelling arguments
on both sides of the issue. Until such time as a pro-
scription is promulgated, however, lawyers and
firms will have to grapple with the matter at a
more personal level. Those lawyers who decide to
serve as directors for client corporations should be
attentive to their duties, obligations and potential
liabilities under state and federal law.
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Rominations Reeded
by October Pt for the
following awards
1. Two outstanding county bar associations
for efforts and activities in improvement of
the legal profession, in community services
and public relations.
2. The Hicks Epton Award in honor of
former OBA President Hicks Epton, the in-
ventor of Law Day, for noteworthy Law
Day programs conducted by individuals or
groups either lawyer or lay.
3. The Golden Gavel Award to those OBA
committees performing with a high degree
of excellence.
4. The Maurice Merrill Essay Award in two
categories, to-wit:
a. The high school student writing the
best Law Day essay; said award to
carry with it a $100.00 cash prize.
b. To the author of the best published
contribution to the Oklahoma Bar
Quarterly; said recipient to be chosen
by the Board of Editors of the
Oklahoma Bar Journal, to be known as
the Maurice Merrill Golden Quill
Award.
5. The Liberty Bell Award to individuals or
groups, either lawyers or lay, and the news
media for contributions to the administra-
tion of justice or service to the Oklahoma
Bar Association.
6. The Half Century Award to those members
of the Oklahoma Bar Association who
have served their profession 50 years.
7. The Outstanding Young Lawyer Award to
members of the Oklahoma Bar Association
under 36 years of age who have rendered
meritorious service to their profession.
8. Earl Sneed Award (CLE contribution).
9. Inventor of year; said recipient to be
chosen by the OBA Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law Section.
10. Outstanding lawyer practicing 50 years or
longer.
11. Outstanding lawyer practicing less than 50
years.
Nominations should be mailed or delivered to
OBA Awards Committee, Oklahoma Bar
Association, 1901 North Lincoln Boulevard, P.O.
Box 53036, Oklahoma City, Okla. 73152, on or
before October 1, 1981.
Jack Mattingly
Chairman, Awards Committee
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